PART I. PRINCIPLES
THE PROBLEMS

Europe will still be here in five centuries time. But what sort of Europe? What kind of people live in it? Are they happy?
What should be done?

Europe will not drift into the future, but will build it itself. The above questions – What will our continent look like in 500 years time? Will it be inhabited by happy people? – may no longer be relevant in a century from now. It could be too late. Unless these questions are answered quickly, there will perhaps no longer be a choice, as all the opportunities will have slipped through our fingers. These questions must answered and the problems solved now. Although we can leave the details for later on, the basic line of development must be decided upon now.

The object of writing this book is to suggest concrete solutions to the main problems, as well as contribute to the ongoing dialogue. Shelves of books have been written over the last few decades concerning the problems and future of the world, like those mentioned in the next few chapters. Some of them were really influential, but mostly they never achieved more than stimulating a limited circle of readers or a minority language group. Not one of them ever achieved its goal of changing the world. I believe there is a good reason for this.

It is fairly easy to grasp the great problems of the world as a theoretical entity, neither are there any major differences in opinion concerning their nature when enlightened people are discussing them. But this is not enough as it has little effect on business or government decision makers. They require concrete, detailed advice. They are incapable of bridging the gap between ideologies and theories and practice solutions. The purpose of this book is to build such a bridge, a concrete bridge offering concrete solutions to the problems. But before doing this I would like to return briefly to the conclusions arrived at already.

Of all the many books on the subject, I consider two worthy of mentioning in detail here, despite the risk of repeating what many readers will already be well aware of.

The Limits to Growth

The publication in 1972 of a report for the Club of Rome entitled The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al, 1972) caused quite a stir, among both intellectuals and the general public. This was the first analytical global forecast, covering the next several decades, which considered the interaction of the numerous variables involved. The book’s message is summarised at the end of Chapter 5 by answering the question: “What measures have to be taken to ensure the survival of the world?”. The answer is contained in Stabilised World Model II.

The authors suggest the following terms for global survival: 1) after 1975 the average desired family size is two children, and the population has access to 100 per cent effective birth control, 2) the economic system endeavours to maintain average industrial output per capita at about the 1975 level, and excess industrial capability is employed for producing consumption goods rather than new industrial capital investment, 3) the new technologies taken into use in 1975 will decisively reduce pollution, erosion and the use of resources, as well as increase harvests, 4) sufficient food is produced to feed all people, and 5) economic resources are directed more towards education and health rather than material goods.
Beyond the Limits

Unfortunately, the world did not respond to the above demands. So twenty years later the authors updated their analyses, and in Beyond the Limits (Meadows et al, 1992) presented 13 computer-simulated scenarios. Only two of them, 10 and 13, offered a future for the world and mankind without going through an intermediate stage of catastrophic proportions. Even these are only possible as the result of compulsory measures almost arbitrary in character.

Scenario 10 is the more realistic of the two and there is good reason to suppose that it stands comparison to our anticipated future. It states that the following measures are unavoidable: 1) that the desired family size after 1995 is two children and that complete birth control is in operation, 2) that industrial production per capita remains at a level one-third higher than 1990, 3) that food production per capita remains at the 1990 level, and 3) that new technologies are taken into use in 1995 that will reduce pollution emissions, erosion and the use of natural resources, and increase agricultural yields.
A comparison

In comparing the 1972 and 1992 reports, you cannot avoid the question as to how they differ in their conclusions. Both offer theoretical ways out of the dilemma. The similarity in means is also striking. Do the authors suggest, believe and imagine that, from one decade to the next, rapid changes are not only inevitable, but also feasible and adequate enough to ensure survival? Or is it that they just wish to console us?
The essential differences between Stabilised World Model II (1972) and Strategy 10 (1992) concern not only the actions to be taken, but also the basic assumptions. They differ quiet radically from each other. In the latter scenario, the basic stock of original and untouched resources available for industrial utilisation (of which a part has been used in both scenarios) is assumed to be twice that of the earlier estimate. Even though new resources have been found during the two decades, they are less easily utilisable than those discovered earlier. This has to be taken into consideration.

Furthermore, in comparing the 1992 scenario to that for 1972, it is assumed that in 2100 1) the global population is 32 % higher, 2) the amount of food per person is only 68 % of the former, 3) the real, unused stock of resources is considerably less, and 4) industrial output per person is 10 % higher.

In spite of these assumptions, emissions remain under control in the 1972 scenario, whereas in the one for 2000-2100, the world is in the grips of a major pollution crisis.
The solution proposed in 1972 would have led to an infinitely better result than the one offered twenty years later. It was not accepted – and now it is totally inadequate. With the best of intentions, any realist has to recommend a model which is in every respect harsher and tougher than an earlier one. As I assume that even this model will be rejected, in 2012 we shall be faced with an even more severe and brutal crisis.

Both reports fail to recognise that binding international agreements and a fundamental ideological transformation of production are unavoidable in both scenarios.

Neither do the studies propose any detailed solutions. This is a general problem. Most books dealing with the future of our planet are theoretical, nonchalantly leaving concrete solutions for others to worry about.
What next?

The solution I put my faith in consists of three essential elements: 1) a quick halt to population growth throughout the world, 2) making the structure of production in developing countries sustainable and oriented towards their national cultures, and 3) the introduction of a new industrial system in the technologically advanced countries. In this book I only intend to discuss the third element, although I consider the other two equally as important. A further limitation is that I am only concerned with Europe. For both reader and author alike, it is easier to deal with one issue at a time. However, I shall try to amplify the third element by tackling a number of specific problems in greater detail.

Europe is in danger of becoming a prisoner of its past. If this is allowed to happen, then I do not see a particularly roseate future for our continent. Europe already possesses the means to improve itself, as well as to minister to the whole planet. Within the next generation, Europe could change into a continent that not only has a past, but also a future. But this requires a radical change in attitudes, a complete transformation of the structure of industry, and a revolution in production and technology. This revolution is both possible and realistic. The door is ajar, let us throw it wide open.